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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
To hold that when the government finds its own property in hands
but one removed from these wilful trespassers, and asserts its right
to such property by the slow processes of the law, the holder can set
up a claim for the value which has been added to the property by
the guilty party in the act of cutting down the trees and remov-
ing the timber, is to give encouragement and reward to the wrong-
doer, by providing a Safe market for what he has stolen, and com-
pensation for the labor he has been compelled to do to make his
theft effectual and profitable.
We concur with the circuit judge in this case, and the judgment
of the circuit court is affirmed.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
1
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.
2
SUPREME COURT OF MiISSOURI.
1
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.
4
SUPREBIE COURT OF RHODE ISLAND.
5
SUPREME COURT OF VERMONT.
6
ACCORD.
Parol Release of Judgment for less Sum than due.-A parol release
of a judgment for money, in consideration of the payment of a less sum,
is invalid, although such release is indorsed upon the execution issued
in the original action: Weber v. Couch, 134 Mass.
ACTION. See Tender.
AGENT.
Contract by/ Broker-Pay/ment to Broker -by Purchaser.-A broker
who was not inLrusted with the possession of the property, contracted in
his own name to sell the same to a vendee, who had no knowledge that
the broker was not the real owner but dealt with him as such. The
broker notified his principals that he had sold for them, and directed
I Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1882. The cases will probably appear in 7 Otto's Reports.
2 From John Lathrop, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 134 Mass. Rep.
s From T. K. Skinker, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 77 Io. Reports.
4 From E. L. De Witt, Esq., Reporter. The cases will probably appear in 38
or 39 Ohio St. Rep.
5 From Arnold Green, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 14 R. I. Rep.
6 From Edwin T. Palmer, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 55 Vt. Rep.
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where to ship the property to the purchaser. The owners, without any
knowledge that the broker had contracted in his own name, and without
any conduct on their part clothing the broker with authority to receive
payment for them, or any possession, actual or constructive, of the pro-
perty, delivered the same to the vendee. Held, payment by the.pur-
chaser to the broker, under such circumstances, is not a bar to the right
of recovery by the owners : Crosby v. Hill, 38 or 39 Ohio St.
BAILMIENT.
Bank-Deposit of Bonds for safe keeing-.Negligene.-The plain-
tiff delivered to the defendant bank $4000 of U. S. bonds and received
this writing: "Received of J. D. Whitney four thousand dollars for
safe keeping as a special deposit. S. T). Waite, C." Held, that it was
a naked deposit without reward; that the defendant would not be liable
for the robbery or larceny of the bonds, unless there was complicity or
bad faith; that it was answerable only for fraud or for gross negligence;
that the law demands good faith, and the same care of the plaintiff's
bonds as defendant took of its own of like character: Wkitner v. Firt
Nat. Bank of Brattleboro, 55 Vt.
The facts that the safe was left open during the transaction of busi-
ness, that there was no gate in the passage-way from the rear of the
banking-room behind the counter and that only one person was left in
charge of the bank about noon each day, do not seem so unusual
as to be accounted negligence, much less gross negligence : Id.
The true test of gross negligence in this case is whether the defend-
ant took the same care of these bonds as it did of its own : Id.
BANK. See Bailment,
BANKRUPTCY.
Discharge-Foreign Creditor.-A debt contracted and payable in
Canada by a person resident in this state to a person resident in Canada,
is not barred by a discharge under the U. S. Bankrupt Act, when the
foreign creditor neither proved his debt in bankruptcy, though provable
under the act, nor in any way was a party to the proceedings, nor had
personal notice thereof: JActougall v. Page, 55 Vt.
BILLS AND NOTES. See Limitations, Statute of.
Lost Note-Right of Payee to Sue.-The payee of a lost note which
is negotiable and payable to him or bearer cannot sustain an action at
law to recover the amount; a court of equity alone can give relief:
Adams v. Edmunds, 55 Vt.
BROKER. See Agent.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Municipal Corporations.
Regulation of Gommerce-Prohibition of Sale of Oleomargerine.-
The act prohibiting the manufacture or sale of oleomargerine or any other
article in imitation of butter or cheese, is constitutional: State v. Ad-
dington, 77 2)o.
State enactments which have the effect of regulating commerce between
the states are not obnoxious to that provision of the constitution of the
United States which declares that "Congress shall have power to reg-
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ulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states and
with the Indian tribes," unless they conflict with regulations on the
same subject prescribed by Congress: Id.
Prohibition of Sale of Patented Articles.-For the purpose of pro-
moting the public welfare the legislature has power to regulate or forbid
the sale of patented articles, to the same extent as articles not patented,
if no discrimination is made: Palmer v. State, 38 or 39 Ohio St.
icense on Ferry-boafg-Exemptionf 'om Taxation-Police Power-
Regulation of Commerce- Tonnage Duty.-Defendant was authorized
by its charter, granted in Illinois, to run a ferry between St. Louis and
East St. Louis; a section of one of the incorporating acts provided
"that the ferry established shall be subject to the same taxes as are
now, or hereafter may be, imposed on other ferries within this state and
under the same regulations and forfeitures." Held, that the meaning
of this was that the ferry, having only one of its landings in the state
of Illinois, was to be subject to the same taxation as ferries wholly
%ithin the state; and the most that can be claimed is that it exempted
the ferry company from any other taxation and exactions than such as
were imposed on like property similarly situated : Ferry Co. v. East St.
Louis, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1882.
There was a proviso in the charter that nothing therein should inter-
fere with the power of any existing municipal corporation, or any there-
after created, to exercise all such powers of police as might be properly
conferred on a city corporation. Hield, that the imposition of a license
fee of $100 per boat by the city of East St. Louis under its charter,
was an exercise of police power within the meaning of the proviso, and
was not a regulation of commerce or a duty of tonnage within the mean-
ing of the Constitution of the United States: Id.
The enrolment and licensing of the boats under the laws of the
Ulnited States did not exclude the right to impose the license in ques-
tion, the power to regulate commerce among the several states not inter-
fering with the police powers of a state in granting ferry licenses :,Id.
CONTRACT. See Eguity.
CORPORATION.
Deed-Signature-Seal.-The granting clause of a deed-, the record
of which was offered in evidence, was as follows: " Know all men by
these presents that the W. K. Land Compatiy, by S. H., president, and
T. S. C., secretary, * * * has granted," &c. The attestation clause and
signatures were as follows : "In witness whereof, we hereunto subscribe
our names and affix our seals." (Signed) " S. H., president, (Scroll) ;
T. S. C., secretary (Scroll); W. K. Land Company (Scroll)." The cer-
tificate of acknowledgment stated that S. H., president, and T. S. C.,
secretary, "acknowledged that tbey executed and delivered the same as
their voluntary act and deed." Held, that the deed was the deed of the
corporation. The form of signature did not make it the individual deed
of S. H. and T. S. C.; and one of the seals appearing on the record
would be presumed to be the seal of the corporation: City of Kansas
v. Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad Co., Mo.
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CRIirNAL LAW. See Extradition.
Alibi-Burden of Proof.-Where the evidence tends to prove the
commission, by the defendant., of the crime charged in the indictment,
at a particular time and place, and the defendant offers evidence tending
to show that at such time he was at another place, it is error for the
court to charge the jury that testimony tending to show such alibi was
not to be considered, unless it established the fact by a preponderance
of evidence. The burden of proof was not changed when the defendant
undertook to prove an alibi, and if, by reason of the evidence in rela-
tion to such alibi, the jury should entertain reasonable doubt as to the
defendant's guilt, he should be acquitted, although the jury might not
be able to find that the alibi was fully proved : Walters v. State, 38 or
39 Ohio St.
Perjury-Sect. 5392 Rev. Stats. construed.-The defendant, who was
clerk of a circuit and district court, was indicted for perjury in swear-
ing before the district judge to his emolument returns and an account
for services rendered to the United States : Hfeld, that this instrument
was a "written declaration" or "certificate" within the meaning of sect.
5392 of the Revised Statutes: United States v. Ambrose, S. 0. U. S.,
Oct. Term 1882.
DEED. See Corporation.
EQUITY. See Insurance.
Reformation of Cotrat.-By a written agreement between S. and
E., S. agreed to convey land to E., "subject to" an incumbrance on it
of $9000, and E. agreed to pay to S. $15,000, by conveying to him land,
some of it "subject to" an incumbrance. Without any further bargain,
S. delivered to E. a deed, conveying the land "subject to" the incum-
brance, and also containing a clause stating that E. assumes and agrees
to pay the debt secured by the incumbrance, as part of the consideration
of the conveyance. E., being ill, did not read the clause in the deed
respecting the assumption of the debt, but discovered it afterwards, and
promptly brought this suit to have the deed reformed. He had made
two payments of interest on the incumbrance. In the negotiations prior
to the agreement, S., through his agent, had solicited E. to assume and
agree to pay the incumbrance, but E. refused. S. understood the differ-
ence in meaning between the two forms of expression. D., the owner
of the incumbrance, was no party to the transaction, and had done noth-
ing in reliance on the deed. Hfeld (1), The agreement created no lia-
bility on the part of E. to pay the debt to D. ; (2) there was a departure
in the deed, through mutual mistake, from the terms of the actual agree-
ment; (3) under the special circumstances of the case E. had a right
to presume that the deed would conform to the written agreement, and
was not guilty of such negligence or laches in not observing the provis-
ions of the deed as should preclude him from relief, nor was he guilty
of any ]aches in seeking a remedy; (4) the payment by E. of interest
on the incumbrance was not inconsistent with his not having assumed
the payment of the debt; (5) E. is entitled to have the deed reformed:
Elliott v. Sackett, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1882.
Relief against Unconscionable Contract.-A., who was of improvident
habits and unskilled in affairs, applied to B., a real estate and mortgage
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broker, to procure a loan, having previously had loans from him. B.
prolonged the negotiations for a month, objecting to the security offered,
which was an undivided interest worth some 810,000 in inherited realty,
and finally loaned A. $2000 instead of $1000, the sum originally re-
quested by B., taking from A. a note for the payment of $2000, six
months after date, with interest at the rate of five per cent. per month,
payable monthly in advance till said principal sum is paid, whether at
or after maturity, and all instalments of interest in arrear to carry inter-
est at the same rate till paid." The note was endorsed of its date,
Received one month's interest to December 18th 1879, $100. When
this transaction took place a statute allowed parties to make their own
agreements as to interest, and prescribed six per cent. in the absence of
any.agreement. Subsequently A. filed a bill in equity against B. to
redeem the mortgage and to reduce the rate of interest: -Held, that in
the relation of the parties B. had taken an unconscionable advantage of
A., and that A. was entitled to relief: Held, further, that the case
should be referred to a master to fix a reasonable rate of interest, not
less than six per cent., on the note and unpaid instalments of interest,
and to report the amount due: Brown v. Ball, 14 R. I.
Injunction against Suit at Law- When not Granted.-A bill in equity
was filed to enjoin an action at law because: 1. The election was on a
judgment which had been satisfied. 2. The judgment creditor was
guilty of laches in delaying to bring his action. 3. The action was ma-
liciously brought to harass and oppress. On demurrer to the bill: Held,
that the demurrer should be sustained. As to the first allegation of the
bill the remedy at law was complete. As to the second, equity will not
enjoin an action at law because delayed, if brought within the statutory
period of limitation. As to the third, equity will not enjoin the prose-
cution of legal rights because the prosecutor's motives are malicious:
Clark v. Clavp, 14 R. I.
EVIDENCE. See Criminal Law; Will.
Sending Letter through ilail-Proof of, admissible.-In an action
for the price of goods sold, upon the issue whether the plaintiff sent a
bill of the goods by mail to the defendant and the defendant received
it, evidence is admissible that upon the envelope containing the bill was
printed a request for a return of the letter to the post-office address of
the plaintiff, if not called for in ten days, and that it was not returned to
him : Heddon v. Roberts, 134 Mass.
EXTRADITION. See Process.
Detentionfor dlfferent Crime.-A, person extradited under the pro-
visions of the treaty of 1842, between the United States and Great
Britain, cannot be detained in custody and prosecuted for a different
crime than the one specified in the warrant of extradition : State v.
'Vanderpool, 38 or 39 Ohio St.
The provisions of this treaty are part of the law of the land, enforce-
able by the judicial tribunals of this state in behalf of a person so
detained and prosecuted: Id.
FRAUJD.
Sdt by Party to Fraud- When entitled to reeover.-A party, whether
plaintiff or defendant, at law or in equity, who can make out his case
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without introducing into it a fraud in which his opponent and himself
participated, will obtain relief in spite of any effort on the part of such
opponent by'plea or offer of proof to set up such fraud: Ghaffee v. Sprague,
14 R. I.
On a bill in equity to foreclose a pledge, the respondent submitted to
the court for allowance issues to the jury whether the pledge was not
given with intent to defraud the respondents' creditors: Held, that the
issues should not be allowed: Id.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
Guaranty of Note of Third Person given for Guarantor's Debt.-An
oral guaranty of the payment of the note of a third person, given in
payment of a debt of the guarantor, is within the Statute of Frauds,
even if the principal object of the transaction is the payment of the
guarantor's own debt: Dows v. Swett, 134 'Mass.
GiFT.
Donatio C zusa Mlorts-What constitutes.-To support a donatio
causa mortis there must be a delivery of the subject by the donor as a
gift, and the delivery must be such as, in ease of a gift inter vivos,
would invest the donee with the title: McCord v. HeCord, 77 Mo.
Where a father in his last illness placed a package of money in the
possession of his son to take care of, and some days afterward directed
the son, in case he should not get well, to take the money and, after
paying funeral expenses, &c., to divide the remainder equally between
himself and certain of his brothers and sisters: Held, that the only de-
livery ever Inade by the father being by way of bailment and not in
execution or contemplation of a gift, there was no donatio causa
mortis : Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Divorce-Alimony-Power to modfy judgment.-Jurisdiction to
award alimony in divorce proceedings is purely statutory. Hence when
a judgment for alimony has been made without reserve, and the time
within which a new trial can be had has elapsed and there is no statutory
provision for modifying the judgment, the judgment is final and cannot
be changed: ,Sammis v. fedbury, 14 R. I.
0. obtained, in 1879, a divorce a vinculo from her husband G., and a
decree awarding her one-half the rents of G.'s realty for her life, and
one-half G.'s personalty as alimony; also one-half the rents of G.'s
realty and one-half G.'s personalty as a provision for her children by
G. 0. subsequently married again, and in 1883 G-. petitioned for d
reduction in the amount of alimony, claiming that C.'s husband was well
able to support her and that at the trial of the divorce petition G. was
absent from the state, and through accident and mistake was not pre-
sent. Held, that the court had no jurisdiction to consider the petition:
Id.
INSURANCE.
Refusal of Company to receive Premiums-Remedy in Equity-
Waiver of Stipulation for Forfeiture- Course of Business.-Where an
insurance company refuses to receive from the assured a premium on a
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life policy, on the ground that the policy has lapsed by reason of the
non-payment of such premium on the day stipulated for its payment,
and the assured claims that the company has waived the right to assert
such forfeiture, equity has jurisdiction to determine, on the petition of
the assured, the rights of the parties under such policy, and, if the pol-
icy is found to be in force, to compel the company to receive the pre-
miums thereon and issue renewal receipts: Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Tul-
lidge, 38 or 39 Ohio St.
Although a life policy and the renewal receipts may contain a stipu-
lation or notice that agents of the company shall not have authority to
waive forfeitures where premiums have not been paid on or before the
day designated for their payment, yet the course of business between
the agent, the assured and the company, in giving effect to payments
made when overdue, may be such that the company will be precluded
from objecting to a payment tendered when overdue, where no notice
had been given the assured that in the future such overdue payments
would not be received, and where no part of the last eight premiums,
all of which had been received by the agent when overdue, had been
returned bythe company: Id.
Accident -Policy- Unnecessary .Exposure to Danger.-Under a policy
of insurance against accident, providing that no claim shall be made
under it when the death or injury may have happened in consequence
of exposure to any obvious or unnecessary danger, and containing a con-
dition that the assured is required to use all due diligence for personal
safety and protection, no recovery can be had for the death of the as-
sured, which is caused by his being struck by a railroad train, while
running along the tracks in front of it in the night time, for the pur-
pose of getting on a train approaching in an opposite direction on a par-
allel track: Tuttle v. Ins. Co., 134 Mass.
Waiver of Proofs-Rule of Construction of Policy.-It is well settled
that if a party insured calls upon the insurer to pay his loss, and the
latter makes no specific objection to the form or sufficiency of such
proofs of loss as are offered, or to the entire neglect to furnish such
proofs, in season for the claimant to repair his error, but declines to pay
the claim upon other grounds, he will be estopped from setting up de-
fects in the proof of loss as a defence to the claim, being presumed to
have waived them, or the most that the insurer can claim is that the
question of waiver may go to the jury : Mosely v. 1lfut. Fire Ins. Co.,
55 Vt.
Policies are construed liberally in respect to the insured, strictly in
respect to the company; thus, where the subject of insurance was only
"goods and groceries," and there was a clause in the policy that the
keeping of gunpowder for sale or on storage "upon or in the pi emises
insured," the court held that the meaning of the word ,1 premises," as
used in the policy was "lands and tenements ;" that it did not include
",goods and groceries ;" and, therefore, if gunpowder had been kept on
premises" not insured, it would not vitiate the policy : Id.
INTEREST.
Mfow calculated on Judgment under Texas Statute- What is a Con-
tract bearing a Specified lnterest.-A note was given for the principal
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debt, with interest, added to the date of maturity, at the rate of twenty
per cent. ; a statute of Texas provided that "all judgments * * *
shall bear interest at the rate of eight per cent. per annum, from and
after the date of the judgment, except when the contract upon which
the judgment is founded bears a specified interest greater than eight
per cent per annum, and not exceeding the highest rate of conventional
interest permitted by law (twelve per cent.), in which case the judgment
shall bear the same rate of interest specified in such contract and after
the date of such judgnent:" Held, that a judgment on the above note
only bore interest at eight per cent. : Ewell v. Dagqgs, S. 0. U. S., Oct.
Term 1882.
JUDGMENT. See Accord.
LIBEL.
Explanation of Language-Evidence.-In an action for a libel where
the language used is ambiguous or ironical, the plaintiff's acquaintances
may state their understanding as to whom" the libellous charge refers, and
what it imputes: Knapp v. Fuller, 55 Vt.
The def ndant, after suit was brought, published another article re-
ferring to the plaintiff by name. It was admissible to show the animus
in publishing the first article: Id.
Also, what one of the defendants said, a few days after the first pub-
lication, manifesting a hostile feeling towards the plaintiff, was admissi-
ble : Id.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.
Promissoryj Note- What is not.-An instrument, signed by the maker
and witnessed by a third person, stating that the maker had received of
S. a horse, for which he promised to pay S. or order a sum named in
one month from date, "said horse to be and remain the entire and abso-
lute property of the said S. until paid for in full by me," is not a pro-
missory note, and an action upon it cannot be maintained which is
brought more than six years after its date; Sloan v. .AfcCarti, 184
Mass.
Mortgage to secure Note-Foreclosure after six Years.-An action to
foreclose a mortgage, given to secure a note, may be commenced at any
time within twenty-one years after its execution, notwithstanding the
note is barred by the Statute of Limitations: Riddle v. Howenstein, 38
or 39 Ohio St.
Award-Specialty.-An award under seal is a specialty within the
meaning of the Statute of Limitations; and this is so though the sub-
mission was by parol: Ralnon v. flalnon, 55 Vt.
MORTGAGE. See Limitations, Statitte of.
Growing Crops-Chattel Mortgage.-The owner of land may make a
valid chattel mortgage of a growing crop that he has planted, which is
superior to the lien acquired by another creditor's subsequent attach-
ment: Kimball v. Sattle y, 55 Vt.
The mortgagor of a farm, in possession, and after condition broken,
may make a valid chattel mortgage of the growing grass thereon, which
is superior to the lien acquired by another creditor's subsequent attach-
ment : Id.
VOL. XXXI.-87
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
Right to issue Bonds in aid of a Railroad-Meaning of Phrase
Cc near such townshp"-Estoppel-Res Adjudicata.-Under an act of the
legislature of Missouri, county courts were authorized to subscribe, in
behalf of townships in their respective counties, to the capital stock of
any railroad company within that state, "building or proposing to build
a railroad into, through or nearsuch township," and to issue bonds in
the name of the county in payment of such subscription. There was a
vote of a township in favor of issuing bonds in aid of a particular rail-
road company. The subscription was made and the bonds issued, recit-
ing that they were authorized by a vote of the people, and were issued
under and pursuant to an order of the county court by authority of the
act. When the vote was taken and the bonds issued, the company did
not propose to build a road into or through the township, but it was pro-
posing to build one from a point nine miles distant from the township to
a further distance. Interest on the bonds was paid for three years. In
a suit on coupons of the bonds'by a bona fide holder for value : Held,
that the courts should acquiesce in the determination by the qualified
voters and the local authorities that the proposed road was near the
township, and hold that there was legislative authority for issuing the
bonds : Kirkbride v. Lafayette County, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1882.
Ordinance- Validity-Disposal of Bodies of Dead Animals.-Under
the constitution of this state, a city ordinance is void which undertakes
to confer upon one person the right to remove and convert to his own
use the carcasses of all dead animals, not slain for food, found within
the limits of the city, to the exclusion of the right of the owners of the
same to remove and use them before they become a nuisance : River
Rendering Co. v. Behr, 77 Mo.
NATIONAL BANK.
Power to Loan on Security of Warehouse Receipt.-A national bank
has power to lend money upon the note or other personal obligation of
the borrower secured by the pledge of a warehouse receipt for merchan-
dise as collateral security: Cleveland v. First National Bank, 38 or 39
Ohio St.
NEGLIGENCE.
Contributory-Failure to look before crossing llighway.-In an ac-
tion for personal injuries occasioned to a woman sixty-seven years old,
by being knocked down by a horse and wagon, while crossing a street
on some flagstones at a point where the street forms a junction with two
other streets, all much travelled, in the compact part of a city, the fact
that, before attempting to cross and while crossing, she did not look up
or down the street but straight ahead, is not conclusive evidence of a
want of due care on her part; but the question is rightly submitted to
the jury: Shapleigh v. Wyman, 134 Mass.
Contributory-Sailing Boat on Sunday- Wilful Ivjury.-If a person
sails for-pleasure in his yacht on thb Lord's day, in violation of the Gen.
Stats. c. 84, sect. 2, and if, while he is so sailing, his yacht is injured
by being negligently run into by a steamboat, his unlawful act neces-
sarily contributes to the injury, and he cannot maintain an action there-
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for against the owner of the steamboat; but if the act of those in charge
of the steamboat, in running against the plaintiff's yacht, was wanton
and malicious, he can maintain such action, if they were acting within
the general scope of their employment, and were executing their mas-
ter's business: Wallace v. .Merrimackc River Nay. and Ex'. Co., 134
Mass.
PARTNERSHIP.
.Marshalling of Assets- When refused.-Three railroads were opera-
ting under a partnership arrangement three lines of road. B. obtained
a judgment against one of the railroads for injuries received through
its neglect, not knowing of the partnership. He levied his execution
on an engine, tender and baggage car, owned by the three companies,
and the same were sold to his agent, L.; and be had also levied
upon another engine owned by the same companies, and had adver-
tised it for sale, when he was enjoined. A bill having been brought
setting up the superior rights of partnership creditors, held, although
the rights of partnership creditors, as a rule in equity are superior
to those of the individual creditors, yet the court will not enjoin where
equities are equal, or where, as in this case, it does not clearly appear
by allegation or proof that the partnership indebtedness existed at the
time the property was seised on execution, or, especially, under the
special provisions of our statute, R. L. sect. 3443, whereby a passen-
ger, injured through the negligence of a railroad company, has a right
in attaching cars, engines, &c., superior to the general equity of the
partners: Lamoille Val. Raitroad Co. v. Bixby, 55 Vt.
PAYMENT.
Acceptance of Promise of Third Person.-The simple acceptance, by
suit or otherwise, by a third person, of a promise made to pay a debt
due such third person from another, will not operate to release such
other person from liability to such third person on account of such debt.
To extinguish the obligation of the original debtor, it must appear that
the subsequent obligation was accepted in lieu of his ; otherwise the
second obligation will be regarded only as collateral and additional to
the first: Briscoe v. Callahan, 77 Mo.
PLEADING.
Insurance-Declaration- Conditions in Policy.-In an action on a
policy of insurance it is not necessary to set out in hec verba in the de-
claration the several conditions in the policy, and then allege perform-
ance; or to prove that the insured did not die in a duel, or while
employed on a railroad, &c.: Tripp v. Te Vermont Life Ins. Co.,
55 Vt.
PRESUMPTION.
Of Death from Absence.-There is no presumption of law that a man
who disappeared at an unknown date in the year 1809. was depid on the
29th day of April 1816: Dean v. Bittner, 77 Mo.
PROCESS.
Service of on one brought within Jurisdiction by Writ of Extradition.
-W., a citizen of Pennsylvania, was extradited from that state upon a
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requisition issued by the governor of Ohio, upon application of C., A.
& Co., in a criminal prosecution instituted by them in Hamilton county.
Reld, that the service of a summons and an order of arrest, issued in
a civil action brought by C., A. & Co. against W., and made upon W.
directly after he had entered into a recognisance to appear before the
Court of Common Pleas at its next term, and before conviction and
before he had an opportunity to return to his home, was rightfully set
aside: Compton v. Wilder, 38 or 39 Ohio St.
SALE. See Tender.
Conditional Sale- Waiver-Demand.-By a conditional sale of a
wagon if the vendee failed to pay the note according to its tenor, he for-
feited what he had paid, and the vendor could take the wagon. There
was a failure to fully pay; but the vendor allowed the wagon to remain
with the vendee; and he accepted payments after the last instalment was
due. Without making a demand he brought suit to recover the balance
of the note, attaching the wagon and holding it by virtue of the attach-
ment until the trial commenced, when he entered a nonsuit, and claimed
to hold it under the written contract. Held, if a demand were neces-
sary the bringing of the suit was sufficient: 11atthews v. Lucia, 55 Ft.
By making the attachment the defendant did not waive his right to
the wagon under the conditional sale; nor was he estopped from assert-
ing his right: Id.
Nor did he waive the causes of forfeiture arising from default of pay.
ment by accepting payments after the note was due : Id.
STATUTE.
Implied Repeal by Revision.-A statute revising the whole subject.
matter of a former statute and evidently intended as a substitute for it,
although it contains no express words to that effect, repeals the former:
State v. Roller, 77 Mo.
SUNDAY. See Negligence.
SURETY.
For Adm;nistrator in Replevin Szit-Caim against Estate.-If a
surety in a replevin bond given by an administrator pay a judgment in
the action against the administrator, he will be entitled to recover the
amount from the sureties in the probate bond of the administrator:
State v. Farrar, 77 Mo.
TENDER.
Of Peformavce- WheA not required.-Where a party contracts to
deliver personal property at a given time and place, and is ready and
willing to comply with the terms of his contract at the contract time
and place agreed upon and so notifies the other party to the contract,
who then and there declares that the property if tendered would not be
accepted by reason of an alleged defect therein, such party may main-
tain an action for breach of the contract without actual tender of the
property as required by the terms of the contract : Tullos v. Rogers, 38
or 39 Ohio St.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
TORT.
Joint Defendants-Apportionment of Verdict.-In an action of tort
against several defendants jointly charged, the verdict cannot be appor-
tioned among those found guilty, each being liable in solido without
reference to the 'degree in which he contributed to the tort: Keegar
v. Rayden, 14 R. I.
TRESPASS.
Waste-Permission of Person in Possession.-The action of trespass
does not lie for waste committed upon land by permission of a person
actually in possession, though the possession be unlawful. The remedy
is an action of unlawful detainer, in which the party lawfully entitled
may recover as well the waste and injury committed as the possession :
Hawkins v. Roby, 77 Mo.
TROVER.
Conditional Sale-Partial Payment-Set-off -The plaintiff sold a
herd of cattle conditionally, taking a note therefor for $837.50 and a
lien by which they were to remain his until the note was "fully paid."
The vendee, without the knowledge of the plaintiff, sold a part of the
cattle to the defendants, who paid him, and he paid the plaintiff, the
plaintiff endorsing it on the note. In an action of trover, the note re-
maining unpaid, held, that the defendants were liable; and that the
money phid by them could not be allowed in mitigation of damages
MAforgan v. Kidder, 55 Vt.
Evidence was not admissible in mitigation of damages to show that
the identical bank bills paid for the cattle were sent to the plaintiff, he
being ignorant of the sale: Id.
Plevin, v. Henshall, 25 E. 0. L. 21, distinguished. Id.
TRuST. See Will.
Discretion as to Payment to Cestui que Trust- When controlled by
the Court.-The testator willed both realty and personalty to each of his
two sons. Afterwards, being dissatisfied with the conduct of one' of
them, he used the following words in a codicil to the will: "I do hereby
revoke the said legacies by my said will given to my said son, Jerome
0. Bacon, and I do give to my son, Delos M. Bacon, all of said legacies
in trust, as follows; that the same be kept by the said Delos M. until in
the judgment of the said Delos M. the said Jerome 0. shall prove him-
self worthy of receiving the same, and then and not till then to deliver
the same to the said Jerome 0. Bacon. It is further my will that if my
said son, Delos 'TI., shall not at any time judge it best to deliver said
property to my said son, Jerome 0., that the same shall be and remain
the property of my said son, Delos M., and his heirs forever." A bill
having been brought by the beneficiary to compel a surrender of the
trust estate, held, 1. It is an express trust for the benefit of the orator,
on condition that he proves himself worthy to have it executed in his
favor, of which worthiness the trustee is made the judge. 2. But he
is not the sole arbiter. His motives may be inquired into. The trustee
cannot exercise his discretion and judgment from fraudulent, selfish or
other improper motives; nor can he refuse to exercise them from such
motives; but he must act bonafide, with a simple view to carry out the
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
intention of the testator; and the court will control his judgment and
discretion to the extent of compelling an honest exercise thereof: Bacon
v. Bacon, 55 Vt.
UNITED STATES.
Customs Duties-Drawback on Articles for Export made of Imported
Materials-Power o] Secretary of the Treasur3/-Jurisdiction of Court
of Claims.-Under the Act of Congress of August 5th 1861, the ex-
porter of articles manufactured from imported materials was entitled to
a drawback equal in amount to the duty paid on such materials, less
ten per cent., " to be ascertained under such regulations as shall be
prescribed by the secretary of the treasury." The regulations were duly
established by the secretary ; but in this case the collector, under in-
structions from the secretary, refused to do the acts required by such
regulations to entitle the exporter to the drawback : teld, 1. That the,
right conferred on the exporter by the act of congress could not be thus
defeated. 2. That the Court of Claims had jurisdiction of such a claim,
as it was founded on a law of congress and the facts raised an implied
contract that the United States would refund to the importer the amount
he paid to the government: Campell et al. v. The United States, S. C.
U. S., Oct. Term 1882.
Customs Duties-Goods not specifically enumerated.-Under sect.
2499 of the Rev. Stat. U. S., when an article is found not enumer-
ated in the tariff laws, the first inquiry is whether it" bears a similitude
either in material, quality, texture or use to which it may be applied, to
any article enumerated ; if it does, and the similitude is substantial, it
is to be deemed the same and charged accordingly. If nothing is found
to which it bears the requisite similitude, an inquiry is to be instituted
as to its component materials, and a duty assessed at the highest rates
chargeable on any of the materials : Collector v. Fox, S. C. U. S., Oct.
Term 1882.
UNITED STATES COURTS. See United States.
Jurisdiction- Question arising under Constitution and Laws of the
United States-Removal of Causes.-An Illinois statute was construed
by the Supreme Court of Missouri and that dedision afterwards pleaded
by way of estoppel in another suit, in a state court of Missouri, between
the same parties, where precisely the same question was raised. An alle-
gation was made that full faith and credit had not been given to the
public acts of the state of Illinois by the decision in question, and the
suit removed to the United States Court. Held, that any mistake in
the decision of the first case could only be corrected by a proceeding
instituted directly for the purpose, that the operation of the judgment
in that case as an estoppel in this did not depend on the constitution or
laws of the United States, but on the effect of a judgment under the
laws of Missouri, and that there was consequently no right of removal:
Railroad Co. v. Perry Co., S. C.. U. S., Oct. Term 1882.
WILL.
Perpetuity-Fund for Preservation of Honument.-A provision in a
will, establishing a fund for the preservation, adornment and repair of
